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Techniques are described herein for downloading an Identity Pre-Shared Key 
(iPSK) passphrase to an Access Point (AP) before Simultaneous Authentication of Equals 
(SAE) is initiated. iPSK may be an individual PSK per client Media Access Control (MAC) 
address. This may help support Wi-Fi® Protected Access 3 (WPA3) SAE clients. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
In today’s Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) deployments, personal WLAN 
security is widely deployed by customers at home, hotspots, metro stations, etc. The main 
challenge is providing network security for personal security WLANs. Most network 
deployments use a common password security key(s) per WLAN network or group of users. 
Some solutions available today involve reducing network threats by using 
multiple/individual passwords. The passwords may be per device based key mapping (e.g., 
Identity Pre-Shared Key (iPSK) per client Media Access Control (MAC) address). There 
may also be multiple PSKs per WLAN. 
The iPSK solution may not work for Wi-Fi Protected Access 3 (WPA3) 
Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) clients because the iPSK password is 
available at the beginning of the SAE handshakes. Hence, the proactive iPSK key caching 
is required to ensure the iPSK password is available before the client starts the SAE 
authentication. Through proactive iPSK key caching at the Access Point (AP) or Wireless 
LAN Controller (WLC), the iPSK password fletching latency may be avoided if the key is 
cached proactively even before the client attempts association / SAE authentication.  
This use case is very important because there are deployments which have 
individual passwords being mapped per device for personal security WLANs. This also 
needs to be solved for WPA3 using SAE-based authentication as well.  
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The challenge for WPA3 SAE based authentication is that iPSK passwords are not 
available when the client attempts SAE authentication. Otherwise, SAE authentication 
cannot be accomplished to derive the session key.  
Figure 1 below is an example sequence diagram depicting SAE-based 
authentication using a common shared WLAN password (PSK). 
 
Figure 1 
Individual passwords (iPSKs) may be available immediately when the SAE 
handshake is started. The individual passwords (iPSK) are fletched from an Authentication, 
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server when the association request is received. 
Once the iPSK password is received, it is used in an Extensible Authentication Protocol 
over LAN (EAPOL) four-way handshake. By contrast, for WPA3 SAE authentication the 
iPSK password is available at the WLC/AP even before association. Accordingly, a 
solution is provided herein to proactively cache the password at the WLC/AP so the WPA3 
SAE client may also authenticate using iPSK passwords.  
The WLC/AP may obtain the individual password (iPSK) from the external server 
even before SAE authentication is initiated by the clients. There are a number of different 
methods for fetching wireless endpoint passwords from a remote AAA server which 
maintains the per-device passwords (iPSKs).  
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The following steps to obtain the iPSK passwords are made available for the WPA3 
SAE client prior to SAE authentication. First, all iPSK passwords are pre-downloaded from 
a server (or identity service) to the WLC/AP. The WLC/AP may retrieve and copy all the 
individual wireless endpoint MAC entries from the server as appropriate. Whenever there 
is an addition or deletion, Change of Authorization (CoA) may be used to indicate the 
change in the password entry file and the AP may retrieve the new iPSK password file. 
The password file may be stored in the WLC/eWLC.  
There are also several trigger points to push the iPSK of the client to the AP. One 
trigger point is pushing the iPSK of the client to the AP when the client sends an active 
probe request to the AP. Another trigger point is pushing the iPSK of the client to the AP 
when the client performs a network query by sending public action Access Network Query 
Protocol (ANQP) messages. Still another trigger point is the AP retrieving the iPSK of the 
client when the AP receives the first SAE message from the wireless client. 
There are several steps involved in retrieving the password of a client that is 
expected to be a WPA3 SAE client. First, the individual password (PSK per client MAC 
address) file is pre-downloaded from an Authentication and Command Authorization 
(ACA) server or identity service to the AP. The AAA server may maintain the password 
per device which may be used while authenticating the personal security WLANs. The 
password may be used for any WPA/WPA2/WPA3 securities. The WLC may download 
the file using Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) messaging. The 
RADIUS response may contain vendor Attribute Value Pair (AVP) payloads having the 
iPSK passwords. All the iPSK passwords are sent to the WLC, which maintains a copy of 
the iPSK passwords per MAC address in the iPSK database. If there is a modification or 
addition to the existing password list on the AAA server it may initiate a RADIUS CoA 
message to indicate to the WLC to re-download the iPSK passwords.  
Figure 2 below is an example sequence diagram depicting this method. 
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Figure 2 
The flow sequence to fletch/push the iPSK password between the WLC and the AP 
are now described. First, the iPSK of the client is pushed to the AP when the client sends 
an active probe request to the AP. The actively probing wireless clients generally send the 
probe request messages to the AP before attempting the authentication/association. When 
the AP receives the probe message from client, the AP sends a message to fletch the iPSK 
password from the WLC.  
Figure 3 below is an example sequence diagram depicting the sequence of message 
flows. 
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Figure 3 
Second, the iPSK password is pushed to the AP when the ANQP query is received 
at the WLC. The Passpoint 2.0 framework provides an ANQP query/response based 
mechanism even prior to authentication/association to the WLAN. The wireless client 
queries the wireless network using the Passpoint 2.0 ANQP query messaging to discover 
network capabilities and information even before attempting wireless 
authentication/association. Passpoint2.0 and WPA3 SAE authentication capabilities may 
be enabled together on the WLAN.  
Figure 4 below is an example sequence diagram depicting operations to push the 
client-specific iPSK password from the WLC to the AP. 
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Figure 4 
Third, the iPSK client password may be retrieved when the SAE commit request is 
initiated by the wireless client. If the iPSK password is not available at the AP, a message 
may be initiated to the WLC to retrieve the iPSK password from the WLC when the SAE 
authentication message (commit message) is started. 
Figure 5 below is an example sequence diagram depicting this sequence of message 
flows. 
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Figure 5 
In summary, techniques are described herein for downloading an iPSK passphrase 
to an AP before SAE is initiated. This may help support WPA3 SAE clients. 
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